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ON POLITICS, DEMOCRACY, AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: A COMMENTARY ON FIRST
NATIONAL BANK V. BELLOTTI*
ARTHUR S. MILLER**
The large private corporation fits oddly into democratic theory. Indeed,
it does not fit.
-Charles E. Lindblom***
I. Introduction
"The legal machinery," Morris R. Cohen once observed, "never
operates apart from human beings, judges, juries, police officials, etc.
The imperfect knowledge or intelligence of these human beings is bound
to assert itself. It is therefore vain to expect that the legal machinery
will work with a perfection that no other human institution does."' Since
Professor Cohen's observation surely is accurate, we should not expect
perfection from the Supreme Court of the United States. Nevertheless,
are we not entitled to expect that the Justices be cognizant of the
economic and political facts of life, and that they give them full and due
consideration? In answering this question, this article will analyze the
Supreme Court's opinion in First National Bank v. Bellotti,2 cast against
an evaluation of the role of the Court in Professor Jesse Choper's
Judicial Review and the National Political Process.' My theme may be
simply stated: Neither Bellotti nor Choper adequately consider the
brute facts of the political economy of American constitutionalism.
Bellotti arguably is the most important first amendment decision in
recent memory. In that case, the First National Bank challenged a
Massachusetts statute forbidding certain expenditures by banks and
business corporations for the purpose of influencing the vote on referenda.
Despite the fact that the referendum in question had nothing directly to
do with the plaintiff-bank's business,4 the Supreme Court invalidated the
* © Copyright 1981 by Arthur S. Miller. This article is based upon the author's work
in progress, a book tentatively entitled ORACLE IN THE MARBLE PALACE: POLITICS AND THE
SUPREME COURT.
** Professor Emeritus of Law, The George Washington University; A.B. 1938,
Willamette University; LL.B. 1949, Stanford University; J.S.D. 1959, Yale University.
*** C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS 356 (1977).
Cohen, Positivism and Idealism in the Law, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 248 (1927).
435 U.S. 765 (1978).
J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980) [herein-
after cited as CHOPER].
' The referendum at issue dealt with a proposed constitutional amendment to allow
collection of a graduated income tax on individuals. 435 U.S. at 769.
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statute.' In an opinion authored by Justice Lewis Powell, the Court
reasoned that the corporation is a constitutional person and, accordingly,
it is to be treated as any other person (ie., a natural person) when first
amendment issues are raised.' "The inherent worth of the speech in
terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the
identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or in-
dividual."7 That is a nice sentiment, and if one accepts the premise that
corporations are always to be equated with natural persons under the
Constitution,' then the decision inexorably flows as a matter of simple
logic. The problem, however, is in the nature of the premise. If it is faulty,
as I believe it is, then Powell's conclusion is invalid.9 Professor Choper
deals with the Bellotti decision by ignoring it, as does Professor John
Hart Ely in his recent book on the theory and practice of judicial
review."°
The implications of Bellotti are abundantly clear. The assets of cor-
porations may be used for all types of political (public) expression,
without regard to whether the content of that expression materially af-
fects the firms. And that is so even though some corporate behemoths,
such as AT&T or General Motors, have assets that not only dwarf those
of any natural person but also are larger than most nation-states of the
world. To pretend that a corporation is a person is a person is a per-
son-to paraphrase Gertrude Stein-and then proceed to suggest that
AT&T, for example, is the same as a natural person for purposes of the
first amendment is to be wilfully blind. Since we must assume that
judges do not divest themselves of their preferences and predilections
when they put on the black robes of judicial office," the myopia of the
Court is understandable, although indefensible. For Choper and Ely to
ignore the portents of Bellotti is more puzzling, particularly since Ely
I Id. at 795. The Bellotti doctrine was solidified in June, 1980 when the Court held
that a public utility could not be prevented from inserting propaganda in its monthly bills.
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 100 S. Ct. 2326, 2336-37 (1980). See also
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 100 S. Ct. 2343, 2354 (1980) (hold-
ing unconstitutional order prohibiting electric utility's promotion of electricity use).
435 U.S. at 776.
' Id. at 777.
' See Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. Ry., 118 U.S. 394, 395-96 (1886); text accom-
panying notes 24-30.
' See Miller, On the Choice of Major Premises, in A. MILLER. THE SUPREME COURT:
MYTH AND REALITY 105-31 (1978) [hereinafter cited as MILLER].
10 J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) [hereinafter cited as ELY]; see also Miller,
Book Review, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 369 (1980) (reviewing ELY).
11 It is vain to contend with judges who have been at the bar the advocates for forty
years of railroad companies, and all the forms of associated capital, when they are
called upon to decide cases where such interests are in contest. All their training,
all their feelings are from the start in favor of those who need no such influence.
Statement of Justice Samuel F. Miller, quoted in C. FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE
SUPREME COURT 374 (1939). See Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional
Adjudication, in MILLER, supra note 9, at 51-87.
For a candid revelation of Justice Powell's pro-business philosophy, uttered just before
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advocates a "representation-reinforcing" theory of judicial review, 2 and
Choper is most interested in the protection of individual rights.1 3 I do not
suggest that the Court or Choper or Ely are not fully aware of the im-
mense disparity in wealth between the disembodied entities called cor-
porations and natural persons. Nor do I say that they are unaware of the
disproportionate strength in the electoral and political processes be-
tween the two. What they do is blithely to disdain, save in a few con-
clusory statements in Bellotti," discussing the question.
If the first amendment is more than the private preserve of the
media-which surely it is'5-then the full significance of Bellotti
becomes apparent. Those with money, provided they are collectivities
called corporations, now have constitutional carte blanche to try to
manipulate the political process. The hidden underbelly of American
politics is now constitutional doctrine. That makes corporations more
equal, as Orwell might have said, 8 than natural persons, who by federal
statute are limited in their electoral contributions. Although limitations
on campaign contributions are valid,'7 personal campaign expenditures
are limited only by the wealth of the person. 8 Corporations, to be sure,
also are limited in what they can contribute to a candidate. After Belloti,
however, they are presumably free to espouse the same views of a given
candidate, and perhaps even the candidate himself, 9 because they have
no direct connection with that candidate. The meaning is clear beyond
he went on the Court, see Powell, Attack on American Free Enterprise System, a
memorandum dated August 23, 1971 and submitted to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
(available from that organization). Among other things, Powell said: "Business must learn
the lesson, long ago learned by labor and other self-interest groups. This is the lesson that
political power is necessary; that such power must be assiduously cultivated; and that when
necessary, it must be used aggressively and with determination- without embarrassment
and without the reluctance which has been so characteristic of American business." That
statement, and the entire memorandum, clearly reveals the philosophical predicate for
Justice Powell's Bellotti opinion. (It is worth at least passing mention that Powell's concep-
tion of American economic history is faulty at best. Businessmen have always known that
"political power is necessary," and, indeed, the history of government-business relations in
the United States can be and has been written around that theme). Given Powell's 1971
views, should anyone be surprised at this 1978 opinion in Bellotti?
11 ELY, supra note 10, at 77-88.
13 CHOPER, supra note 3, at 60-128. Professor Ely would limit judicial review to those
issues that promote representation in government, while Professor Choper would keep the
Supreme Court out of federalism and separation of powers questions. Both are interested in
developing a viable theory to justify judicial review that promotes the rights of natural per-
sons.
1 435 U.S. at 785 n.22, 788-92.
" See 435 U.S. at 798-99 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
" See G. ORWELL. ANIMAL FARM 112 (1946).
" Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 29 (1976) (per curiam).
" Limitations on personal campaign expenditures violate the first amendment. Id at
54.
" See Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. Independent Comm. for Reagan, - F.E.C. -
(1980) (independent committees may expend money on behalf of candidate so long as no con-
tact exists between candidate and committee).
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doubt: In the words of the old frontier maxim, "them as has, gits." As
Justice White's Bellotti dissent observed, money talks in the political
process." That, of course, is a hoary social truism, but it has been
elevated into constitutional law. Nowhere in Powell's opinion is there
recognition of the overwhelming political power of the economic enter-
prise. Nor does Choper acknowledge it, even though his book is said to
be a "functional" analysis. Surely the time has come to recognize cor-
porations for what they are - private governments - and to treat them
as such under the Constitution.21 Surely, too, Professor Choper, who ad-
vocates that the Supreme Court not decide questions of federalism, 
2
should consider the giant corporations to be units of a system of "func-
tional" federalism that is probably as important-perhaps more impor-
tant-than the system of "formal" federalism. 23 As such, those firms
should be held to constitutional standards-they should have duties as
well as rights under the fundamental law.
II. The Function of the Court
Only by the most transparent fiction can the corporation be called a
person. During the first century of our republic, this view was both
generally known and widely accepted -even by the Supreme Court.2' In
1886, however, the Court, under Chief Justice Morrison Waite, had a
blinding flash of revelation: they concluded through an intuition known
only to them that the corporation was a constitutional person. In Santa
Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railway' the Court casually, and
without even hearing argument on the point, determined that enormously
important matter28 - thereby neatly "amending" the fourteenth amend-
ment.'
The significance of Santa Clara County cannot be over-estimated. By
being able to invoke the due process clauses of the Constitution,' cor-
porations have been able to wax large and strong. Those entities are
unique in human history; nothing quite like them has even been seen
prior to the last ninety or so years. I do not suggest that Santa Clara
435 U.S. at 812 (White, J., dissenting).
21 See generally Miller, A Modest Proposal for Helping to Tame the Corporate Beast,
8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 79 (1979).
CHOPER, supra note 3, at 171-259.
See Miller, The Constitutional Law of the "Security State," in A. MILLER. SOCIAL
CHANGE AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW: AMERICA'S EVOLVING CONSTITUTION 43-95 (1979).
2 See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134-35 (1877).
118 U.S. 394 (1886).
Id. at 395-96.
It is interesting to note that those who lambaste the Supreme Court for some of its
fourteenth amendment decisions, see, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (legislative ap-
portionment); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (school desegregation), are
strangely silent about Santa Clara County. See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY
(1977) [hereinafter cited as BERGER].
28 U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 3; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
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County was the principal cause of that development. Surely "technologi-
cal imperatives" had. more to do with it.' Nonetheless, the favorable
legal climate in which corporations operated, in both public and private
law,3" permitted those imperatives to influence the creation and growth
of the modern giant business corporation. These firms are at once
economic entities, sociological communities, and political orders. They
are collectivities: to accord them the speech rights of natural persons, as
the Supreme Court does, is myopic at best.
Neither political scientists nor economists have as yet produced a
satisfactory theory of conscious economic cooperation and its effect on
the constitutional order." Lawyers, with invincible parochialism, still
refuse to recognize the corporation for what it is, and that is so even
though the giant corporation is, as Arthur Bentley said in 1908, "govern-
ment through and through."3 It is economic government, exercising
sovereignty over large segments of society. Although, as Bentley went
on to say, it does not ordinarily use certain "technical methods," such as
hanging, "that is a detail."' (The State still has a monopoly on the exer-
cise of the legitimate use of force.) Corporate governance is a problem
for the constitutional lawyer. By allowing corporate free speech in mat-
ters that do not materially affect the enterprise, the Supreme Court has
accorded the corporation rights without concomitant constitutional
duties-thus giving some credence to the view that the Justices have
legitimated "economic intervention" and accompanied it with an "illu-
sion of equality, justice and freedom."' The Court is now, and in fact
always has been, the "ultimate guardian of corporate privilege."35
This proposition, I realize, does not concur with the popular wisdom
about the modern Supreme Court as guardian of civil rights and liber-
ties. While the Court does have that function, as Professor Choper
cogently shows,38 it also has a greater role. My point is to pose this ques-
tion: Who are the ultimate beneficiaries of those decisions of the Warren
and Burger Courts? Are they about the same as those who have always
benefited-those with money and property? There can be little doubt
that the answer to that question is "yes." To demonstrate the validity of
this proposition requires brief discussion of the function of the Court in
modern America. Some reference, of course, must be made to history,
but principally as a backdrop against which the drama of modern con-
stitutional litigation is played.
" See J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 11-22 (1967).
" See A. MILLER, THE MODERN CORPORATE STATE: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS AND THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 37-49 (1976) [hereinafter cited as THE MODERN CORPORATE STATE]:
", See THE ECONOMY AS A SYSTEM OF POWER (W. Samuels ed. 1979).
2 A. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT 268 (1908).
Roelofs, The Warren Court and Corporate Capitalism, TELOS, No. 39, at 94 (1979).
See THE MODERN CORPORATE STATE, supra note 30, at 93.
See CHOPER, supra note 3, passim.
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Any institution has both a manifest and latent function." My main
conclusion in what follows is similar to, but broader than, that of Pro-
fessor Alan Westin: "In matters directly affecting business, as in labor
relations, antitrust and tax issues, the Warren Court [was] simply an
enunciator of the social capitalist status quo in American politics."' This
observation, it seems to me, can be expanded to cover all, or at the least
most, of the areas of Supreme Court adjudication. When we ask about
both the manifest and latent functions of Court decisions, then it may
readily be seen that "the social capitalist status quo" is furthered by
many decisions which have the manifest function of protecting individual
rights and liberties.
"The fundamental function of the law," McGeorge Bundy once
asserted, "is to prevent the natural unfairness of society from becoming
intolerable."39 Evidence for that observation may be found in the series
of Supreme Court decisions rendered during the past forty years that
outwardly (and actually) protect human rights, but which also serve as
symbolic victories to certain segments of society." Those decisions are a
means of stifling social discontent by permitting liberties which the
State considers relatively unimportant to flourish in what appears to be,
but often actually is not, a permissive society.41 The basic question that
must be asked and answered is: Cui bono? Who in fact benefits from the
Court's civil rights/civil liberties decisions? To answer that question re-
quires, first of all, a recognition that the Court's decisions are a part of a
continuum of governmental actions taken during the past several
decades to ameliorate the brutalities of industrialism. In the main, these
involve social services-in brief, the "Welfare State"-which, as C.B.
MacPherson has said, came because of "the sheer need of governments
to allay working-class discontents that were dangerous to the stability of
the state. It was Bismarck, the conservative Chancellor of Imperial Ger-
many, and no great democrat, who pioneered the welfare state in the
1880s, for just this purpose."' 2 And it is the Supreme Court made up of
lawyer-judges who come from a conservative profession which has
helped to allay some popular discontents in America.
Analysis of the beneficiaries of these decisions must proceed on two
levels. First is the ostensible beneficiary, who often as a person is the ac-
tual beneficiary. But second, and of greater long-range significance, are
the hidden winners-those who profit most from the stability of the con-
stitutional order. During the 1930s and '40s, the Supreme Court revolu-
tionalized constitutional jurisprudence by legitimizing the growing
See R. MERTON. SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 115-122 (rev. ed. 1968).
"A. WESTIN. THE SUPREME COURT UNDER EARL WARREN 56 (1972).
Statement of McGeorge Bundy, quoted in M. MAYER, THE LAWYERS 516 (1967).
"See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (urban voters); Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (black Americans).
4 Compare C. LASCH. THE CULTURE OF NARCISSISM (1978) with F. DONNER. THE AGE OF
SURVEILLANCE (1980).
1Z C. MACPHERSON, THE REAL WORLD OF DEMOCRACY 11 (1966).
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benevolent role of government in the lives of its citizens (ie., the
Positive State). In the process of that reorientation, the Justices changed
their principal role from being "the first authoritative faculty of'political
economy in the world's history" 3 to guardian of human rights and liber-
ties. Those actions, particularly the validation of the Positive State,"'
were taken in conjunction with the political branches of government.
The Court cooperated with Congress and the President in the establish-
ment and furtherance of welfare programs. Cooperation, indeed, is the
forgotten part of separation of powers, as Woodrow Wilson observed in
1908."5 It would be odd if the Justices were so ambivalent as, on the one
hand, to cooperate fully with the politicians, both federal and state, in
socio-economic matters, and, on the other hand, to refuse cooperation
when civil rights or liberties are involved. Cooperation took place there
as well, but on the submerged or latent level. As Professor J. A. G. Grif-
fith concluded in The Politics of the Judiciary," "The judiciary in any
modern industrial society, under whatever economic system, is an essen-
tial part of the system of government and . .. its function may be
described as underpinning the stability of that system and as protecting
that system from attack by resisting attempts to change it."47
The past forty to fifty years are unique in American history. For the
first time, and then only slowly at first, the rights of "discrete and in-
sular minorities"48 began to receive at least some protection from the
High Bench. Ethnic groups and others have begun to get at least the ap-
pearance of rights purportedly guaranteed since the beginnings of the
republic. Two important questions are posed by this development, which
by no means is over even though recent "conservative" appointments
have slowed it in some areas. 9 The questions are: Why did the develop-
ment come so late in American history?; and, What is the sociological
function of increased protection of personal liberties? While each ques-
tion merits attention, our main focus will be on the latter.
The Bill of Rights has been a part of the Constitution since 1791 and
the fourteenth amendment since 1868. Yet it is accurate to say that the
rights protected by the first eight amendments were submerged until
J. COMMONS. LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM 7 (1924).
" For a discussion of the concept of the Positive State, see THE MODERN CORPORATE
STATE, supra note 30, at 86-87; A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN CAPITALISM
72-132 (1968).
"5 W. WILSON. CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 166 (1908)
[hereinafter cited as WILSON].
J. GRIFFITH, THE POLITICS OF THE JUDICIARY (1977).
' Id. at 213. Professor Griffith's conclusion is the basis for my theme in this essay.
The phrase, "discrete and insular minorities," is taken from the famous footnote in
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Full discussion of the
implications of that footnote may be found in ELY, supra note 10, at 145-70.
" The "conservative" appointees are Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehn-
quist, and Blackmun. For an early discussion of these appointees, see L. LEVY, AGAINST THE
LAW 12-54 (1974).
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well into the twentieth century." Why? Additionally, why are those
amendments now fully enforced, insofar as courts can? The same may be
said for the fourteenth amendment: only in very recent years has the
equal protection clause been fully-at least, almost fully-enforced.
Again, why now?
The questions ask much. Only summary treatment can be given
here. For most of our country's history, the Supreme Court read the Bill
of Rights literally, not applying them to the states." Only in 1925 did the
first breakthrough come. 2 Equally significant is the fact that the first
important freedom of expression case was not decided until 19 19,1 and
then the State prevailed. Even the notorious Alien and Sedition Act of
1798" never got to the Supreme Court, despite harshly repressive
measures. The nineteenth century, the myth to the contrary notwith-
standing, was not one of widespread freedom for the mass of the people.
Those who invoked the Constitution were, speaking very generally, the
businessmen who wished to fend off adverse state or federal regulation.
They usually prevailed, either on interstate commerce or obligation of
contracts grounds before the Civil War55 or through the Court's inven-
tion of substantive due process after that conflict. 8
Government in this century is not more repressive than in the past.
If anything, it is less so for the people in general. Life for most people
during most of American history was, as Thoreau said, one of "quiet
desperation." People in the nineteenth century did not think in terms of
rights-most people, that is-but in how to wrest a living from a conti-
nent which, although fabulously wealthy in natural resources, daunted
all but the most courageous and tenacious. One has only to read the
social histories of America,57 as well as novels by Sinclair Lewis, Upton
Sinclair, Theodore Dreiser, Hamlin Garland, and others, to realize that
until well into the twentieth century life for many Americans was not
only desperate but, in the well-known words of Thomas Hobbes, "poor,
nasty, brutish and short." In this century, however, the productivity of
labor vastly increased. Mass production was born and suddenly the
See generally P. MURPHY, WORLD WAR I AND THE ORIGIN OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE
UNITED STATES (1979).
5, See, e.g., Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250-51 (1833) (fifth amendment in-
tended solely as limitation on federal government and does not limit power of state govern-
ments).
52 See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (freedom of speech and press are
among fundamental liberties protected by due process clause of fourteenth amendment).
See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
1 Stat. 596 (1789). See generally L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF
SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY (1960); J. SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETTERS-THE
ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES (1956). Not until 1964 did the
Court squarely address the Act, and then only in dicta. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 273-76(1964).
5 See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (5 Wheat) 1, 239-40 (1824).
' See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 278 (1932).
'" See, e.g., P. CARROLL & D. NOBLE, THE FREE AND THE UNFREE (1977); but see R.
NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY (1932).
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economy produced goods in plenty. Since necessitous men cannot be free
men, the ability of more and more people to sup at the groaning tables of
opulence meant that they were - at long last - able to demand and enjoy
more freedom. I am aware, of course, of the characterization of
Americans as a "people of plenty"' and the role that seemingly
unlimited "free" land had to play in shaping the American experience.
Nevertheless, it is only with the marriage of technology to entrepreneur-
ship that the cornucopia of consumer goods became so large.
Surely the coming of an economy of abundance is one of the reasons
for the civil rights/civil liberties explosion in constitutional law. The two
phenomena-one economic and the other legal-came at roughly the
same time in history. That burst of judicial activism coincided, as
previously noted, 9 with political activism aimed at helping some of the
disadvantaged in society-some of those left behind in the struggle for
greater wealth and status. It would be quite wrong to attribute the ex-
plosion to a newly-discovered altruism in American elites, or to a special
prescience of Supreme Court Justices. Principally, this change in judicial
thinking was the result of an industrial economy in which brutal necessity
no longer stared people down. Business required customers as well as
workers. In sum, recognition of long-submerged constitutional rights
coincided in time with the Golden Age in the United States-the period
of roughly 1945 to 1970 when all seemed possible. The dollar was king,
American military might was supreme, and for the first time both bread
and freedom became possible."
Another reason exists for the latter-day recognition of personal
rights. Groups previously deeply submerged in society began to surface
and demand more. The trade union movement flowered, receiving con-
stitutional protection in 1937.1 Black Americans, long under the thumb
of a rigid caste system, became more insistent that they, too, were per-
sons under the Constitution and entitled to its protections. Add the ex-
pansion of the franchise, coupled with incessant propaganda" about
democracy, and another factor may be seen. Then, too, the United States
fought World War II with conscripts, many-perhaps most-of whom
came from the working class. A tacit perception that those who fought
and won a war would not remain quiescent in the fact of either economic
deprivation or denial of democratic rights may, as in Great Britain, have
" The term, "people of plenty," comes from D. POTTER, PEOPLE OF PLENTY: ECONOMIC
ABUNDANCE AND THE AMERICAN CHARACTER (1954).
6 See text accompanying notes 39-47 supra.
That the post-1970 period portends a reversion of the status quo ante seems obvious.
In the coming "age of frugality," which is hard upon us, the necessity of gathering sufficient
supplies to live will again outweigh freedom and the enjoyment of it. See gener-
ally A. MILLER. DEMOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP: THE EMERGENT CONSTITUTION OF CONTROL (to be
published in 1981).
61 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937) (upholding National
Labor Relations Act).
" For an insightful discussion of propaganda as a tool of all governments, see gener-
ally J. ELLUL, PROPAGANDA (1965) [hereinafter cited as ELLUL].
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been significant in the enhancement of personal rights. These rights and
the government's response to them were economic, as addressed by the
Employment Act of 1946,63 and human, as reflected in the series of deci-
sions that furthered the cause of human decency for black Americans.
I do not suggest that these reasons, which overlap and coincide, ex-
haust all possible explanations of a major historical phenomenon. There
is, Ernest Nagel has told us, no simple and at the same time complete ex-
planation of any social phenomenon." But I do suggest that the reasons
outlined above did play a considerable part in what became Supreme
Court decisions, presidential actions, and congressional statutes. The
zeitgeist has changed. Today Americans enjoy more freedom than ever
before in their history. The "why" is important; but so, too, is the social
function that is served.
All political or social phenomena have functions. In The Pathology of
Politics,65 Professor Carl J. Friedrich argued that such disfunctional-
some would say aberrational- matters as violence, betrayal, corruption,
secrecy, and propaganda all serve definite, identifiable functions,
"notably that of facilitating the adaptation of a system or regime to
changing conditions occurring either in the system or in the social struc-
ture, or in the outside environment."6 The point is not argued here, ex-
cept to say that if such socially objectionable behavior can be functional,
then surely a series of Supreme Court decisions can be similarly analyzed.
Judicial decisions are political epiphenomena,1 and the Supreme
Court is an instrument of politics, both in its lawmaking proclivities and
in the fact that it is a target of interest groups." The Court's function is
to produce decisions that are not only system-maintaining but also
system-developing. "A political function," says Friedrich, "is the cor-
respondence between a political process or institution and the needs or
requirements of a political order." 9 Any political order requires not only
stability but also a process of orderly change. The great and continuing
task of the Justices is to facilitate both elements. Through their deci-
sions they buttress the constitutional order-the "system" - and by pro-
gressive interpretations they enable change to occur within rather
severely constricted boundaries. The need is for a constantly shifting
equilibrium.
As previously suggested, one must distinguish between manifest
and latent functions of societal institutions." Simply put, manifest func-
15 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1025 (1976 & Supp. I 1979).
64 E. NAGEL, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE 447-546 (1961).
C. FRIEDRICH, THE PATHOLOGY OF POLITICS (1972) [hereinafter cited as FREIDRICH].
Id. at 224.
67 See generally M. SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT (1964); A.
MILLER, ORACLE IN THE MARBLE PALACE: POLITICS AND THE SUPREME COURT (in process).
For a discussion of how the Supreme Court was the target of the NAACP in the
cases that culminated in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), see generally R.
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976).
6' FRIEDRICH, supra note 65, at 5.
o See text accompanying notes 37 & 38 supra.
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tions are the outward or obvious ones. They are important in themselves
but must be considered in conjunction with latent functions-those that
do not immediately meet the eye, but which may be of far greater
significance. Using that distinction, what may be said about the Supreme
Court and its egalitarian decisions of the past few decades? The manifest
function, quite obviously, is to bring discrete and insular minorities (and
the other disadvantaged) into the mainstream of American life, to protect
the individual in his personhood against arbitrary governmental acts.
These goals are reflected in the range of decisions involving the status of
blacks,71 women,72 urban voters,73 workers,7" and consumers. 7
The latent function is to protect the system of those who profit most
from it. Hydraulic pressures of social discontent are siphoned off in
judicial decisions that protect some individuals and appear to protect
many more. Ultimately, however, the beneficiaries are those who have
throughout American history profited from the workings of the constitu-
tional order-the moneyed and propertied, "the social capitalist" class.
Social change is facilitated by Supreme Court rulings, at the least possi-
ble cost to those who control and rule.78 The Justices know that in a
period of extraordinarily rapid social change77 it is more important to ac-
commodate new demands without excessive social cost than to preserve
the status quo.
I do not contend that the latent function of the Court, as I have
described it, is the result of a dark and conspiratorial maneuver by a hid-
den power elite. The process is much more subtle than that. But I do say
that human liberties receive constitutional protection only to the extent
that the vital interests of the State are not jeopardized -which means
the vital interests of those who profit most from the State.78 The system,
latent though it is, simply exists. It has a major prophet in Professor B.
F. Skinner and a patron saint in Pavlov, the Russian scientist who
discovered the conditioned reflex.
71 See, e.g., Brown v. Board of-Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
72 See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
7 See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
7' See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
12 See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
78 For a discussion of the "ruling class" in the United States, see G. DOMHOFF. THE
HIGHER CIRCLES: THE GOVERNING CLASS IN AMERICA (1970); see also Miller, Reason of State
and the Emergent Constitution of Control, 64 MINN. L. REV. 585, 589 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Reason of State] (discussing Principle of Economy of Means).
" It is truistic to note the rapid pace of social change in the twentieth century, the
greatest in human history. For discussion of one aspect of this change, see Branscomb, In-
formation: The Ultimate Frontier, 203 SCIENCE 143 (1979) (forecast of technological trends
over next 100 years). The law must be stable, yet it cannot stand still. Legal theorists,
however, have not yet been able to reconcile the notion of law (which connotes a static
system) with rapid social change. Perhaps this is attributable to the fact that our legal insti-
tutions grew out of feudalism, which is a static order, and have, as Woodrow Wilson said, a
Newtonian cosmology behind them. See WILSON, supra note 45, at 54-56.
" See note 76 supra.
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In Beyond Freedom and Dignity79 Professor Skinner stated that
"[w]hat is being abolished is autonomous man-the inner man, the
homunculus, the possessing demon, the man defended by the literatures
of freedom and dignity. His abolition is long overdue .... A scientific
view of man offers exciting possibilities. We have not yet seen what man
can make of man."80 Skinner is neither joking nor speaking in hyperbole.
As an individual, he may be harmless, and no doubt he thinks that his
work is beneficiently furthering the cause of humankind. Others,
however, can and will seize his ideas and apply them. "Gobineau was a
harmless intellectual crank, but out of his harmless theory of the in-
tellectual superiority of the Aryan race came National Socialism. As
Keynes noted: 'The political fanatic who is hearing voices in the air has
distilled his frenzy from the work of some academic scribbler of a few
years back."' 8' The need perceived today is for mind manipulation and,
through it, control over the human being. Aldous Huxley recognized
this, stating:
We have had religious revolutions, we have had political, in-
dustrial, economic, and nationalistic revolutions. All of them, as
our descendants will discover, were but ripples in an ocean of con-
servatism -trivial by comparison with the psychological revolu-
tion toward which we are so rapidly moving. That will really be a
revolution. When it is over, the human race will give no more
trouble.8
Huxley's revolution has already begun. Man is increasingly seen as an
object, and manipulable as such. Mass communications provide the tech-
nological means of accomplishing that end. National advertising pro-
motes it. A pervasive system of propaganda-propaganda, as Jacques
Ellul has said," being characteristic of all governments -helps it along.
During the twentieth century, the rise of the State of preeminence
means that an increasing number of controls are placed upon human ac-
tivity -by both public and private government, for the two interact into
one overarching whole.8 4 At the same time, a subtle "trade-off' accom-
panies the rise in social controls and mass manipulation. It is in this area
that the Supreme Court has had and continues to have an important role
to play. Sometimes, the Court's participation in this process is conscious,
as it was in Brown v. Board of Education,8 when surely the Justices
knew that rising discontent among black Americans would sooner or
later boil over in racial turmoil."
" B. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY (1971).
0 Id at 200, 215.
" W. THOMPSON, EVIL AND WORLD ORDER 24 (1976).
Statement of Aldous Huxley, quoted in A. SCHEFLIN & E. OPTON. THE MIND
MANIPULATORS 10 (1978).
"See ELLUL, supra note 62, at ix, x.
" See THE MODERN CORPORATE STATE, supra note 30, passim.
5 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
" Possible racial turmoil is precisely where the United States stands today. The pro-
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The Supreme Court has sought to lance the boil of social discontent
by constitutionalizing better conditions for the disadvantaged and a per-
missive society generally. In this endeavor, the Court, of course, does
not act alone.8 7 The Court, as an essential part of the system of govern-
ment, cooperates with the other branches. The net result, not all of
which is attributable to the Court, is that life styles are changing; mari-
juana and other drugs are widely used; alcohol consumption is
escalating; abortion has been legalized; tranquilizers are a way of life for
millions of Americans; the press and motion pictures have been freed
from restrictions on even blatant obscenity and pornography; there is
more freedom of speech and of the press today than ever before; and
rights long denied to blacks and women receive at least some protection.
All these, and more, have the latent function of keeping the population
relatively quiescent, particularly when they are coupled with social
welfare (income distribution) programs. Innocuous activities are en-
couraged, at times not subtly, by the mass media (e.g., spectator sports).
A price for increasing controls by the State is permissiveness in
noneconomic areas. Aldous Huxley brilliantly forecast this development
in Brave New World, although he thought it would be 500 years away.88
His timing was off, as he later admitted.89
The Justices have been active participants in this development.
Their decisions in racial segregation cases helped stifle discontent by
giving blacks the hope, at least for a time, of becoming part of the
mainstream of American life. That is perhaps the most obvious of the
decisional areas. Other areas may be discerned as well: decisions permit-
ting printing and showing of material that only a few years ago would
have been considered obscene and punishable;"0 occasional recognitions
that women have been treated unfairly and are also entitled to equal
protection of the laws;9' permitting a young man to go unpunished even
though he paraded through a public building with a slogan "Fuck the
Draft" emblazoned on his leather jacket;92 and recognizing that the "rot-
ton boroughs" of the nation violated the equal protection clause.9" In
these areas-no doubt there are others-the Court helped build the per-
missive society, the "culture of narcissism," the "Me Generation."94 The
mise of Brown has not been fulfilled, and the dashed expectations of millions of blacks can
easily erupt into violence. See G. GILL, MEANNESS MANIA: THE CHANGED MOOD (1980) [here-
inafter cited as GILL].
I See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979) (upholding volun-
tary affirmative action plan).
" A. HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932).
A. HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD REVISITED 4 (i958).
See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
' See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). It is worth noting that the Court could
have "enacted" the Equal Rights Amendment into constitutional law in the Reed case, but
chose not to do so.
" Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
'4See C. LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NARCISSISM (1979).
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pattern is not uniform, of course, for when it was perceived that the vital
interests of the State were at stake the Justices upheld the power of
government. 5
Of course, the Justices are not alone in furthering the subtle controls
being placed on individuals. Other government agencies participate, as
do the major social groups of the nation. Furthermore, they do not out-
wardly assert that they are interested in fulfilling Huxley's prediction.
On occasion the Court does overtly state that its decision effects a con-
nection with the fundamental needs of "society."9 The net result of this
process has been graphically described by Solzhenitsyn:
"[A]s every man goes through life he fills in a number of forms
for the record.... There are hundreds of little threads radiating
from every man, millions of threads in all. If all these threads
were suddenly to become visible the whole sky would look like a
spider's web and if they materialized as rubber bands, buses,
trams and people would lose the ability to move."9
With the tremendous improvements in computer technology and the
coming of micro-processing, the technology is now available and in place
for manipulation of those threads. To Solzhenitsyn, the cobweb sym-
bolizes strangulation and suffocation by bureaucracy in an authoritarian
society. There can be no question that the United States has become
"the bureaucratic state"9 with the bureaucracies being both public and
private and cooperating with each other.9
In summary, the Supreme Court's work prior to 1937 dealt largely
with the rise of finance capitalism. Since then, however, civil rights and
liberties received judicial protection for the first time in American
history. While some individuals have benefited from these judicial deci-
sions, the ultimate-the latent-beneficiary is "the ruling class"-those
with money and property who have always been in control.
That conclusion makes nonsense out of the neo-conservatives'
splenetic complaints that the Court acted unconstitutionally in some of
its more liberal decisions."'9 The very decisions most criticized -those
'5 See, e.g., Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (home visitation by welfare workers
without warrant does not violate fourth amendment); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968) (statute proscribing knowing destruction of draft card does not violate first amend-
ment).
" See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 128 (1959) (questioning by House
Committee on UnAmerican Activities necessary to ensure "national security");
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 501-02 (1951) (Smith Act prohibition against advocacy
of violent overthrow of government does not violate first amendment because of "national
security"). Both decisions are a form of "thought control." See Reason of State, supra note
76, 605-07.
A. SOLZHENITSYN, CANCER WARD (1968).
See generally Wilson, The Rise of the Bureaucratic State, 41 PUB. INT. 77 (1975).
Galbraith describes the cooperative relationship between public and private
bureaucracies as "bureaucratic symbiosis." J. GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC PUR-
POSE 143 (1973) [hereinafter cites as GALBRAITH].
1' See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 27.
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dealing with racial segregation, abortion, and legislative appor-
tionment-have the actual function of damping the fires of social discon-
tent and of helping to achieve stability through peaceful change-the
very values that neo-conservatives cherish. Were they to see beneath
the surface, those critics would applaud rather than complain. Of course,
the judicial decisions are mere stop-gaps, and since the Supreme Court
has no enforcement power of its own, the Justices must depend upon the
good will and good sense of officers in the political branches of govern-
ment for compliance. Although the record on that score is spotty at best,
the decisions do give the politicians time to grapple with some of the
pent-up demands of long-submerged groups.
The changes wrought by the Court in recent decades are, despite the
widespread publicity, minuscule. Some groups have made largely sym-
bolic gains-for example, urban voters. Even for black Americans, the
gains have been more apparent than real.10' The system of corporate
capitalism remains and flourishes, and no doubt will continue to do so if
the Bellotti decision is any indication. The Progressive movement of the
early twentieth century, the New Deal, and the constitutional revolution
of the 1930s and '40s were, in final analysis, a means to perpetuate a
working partnership between business and government. In the post-1937
period when the Court read Keynesian economics into the Constitution
and overtly abandoned laissez-faire, it did not cease to serve the in-
terests of the business class. The Justices merely took a more
sophisticated viewpoint, in accord with the long-range interests of the
dominant corporate interests. Socialism for the poor (but not for the rich)
was staved off, in part by the Supreme Court's giving legal expression to
some of the sources of discontent. Professor Griffith is correct: the
judiciary, as an essential part of the government, protects the stability
of the system of corporate capitalism and resists attempts to change it.
0
2
III. The Significance of Bellotti
Bellotti, in essence, is an anti-democratic decision, part of a backlash
against the spread of the franchise and other aspects of mass democracy.
Professor Samuel P. Huntington, in a well-known essay,0 ' complains
about the "democratic distemper" and the "decline in the governability
of democracy" -simply, it seems, because "democracy" has been suc-
cessful. Democracy is vulnerable, says Huntington, because of "the inter-
nal dynamics of democracy itself in a highly educated, mobilized, and
participant society."'0 4 That viewpoint must be taken seriously, for Hunt-
ington spoke for a highly influential group."
°5
"01 See GILL, supra note 86; Miller, Brown's 25th: A Silver Lining Tarnished With
Time, 3 DISTRICT LAWYER 22 (1979).
' See text accompanying notes 46 & 47 supra.
10 Huntington, The United States, in M. CROZIER, S. HUNTINGTON & J. WATANUKI, THE
CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY 59 (1975).
10 Id. at 115.
105 Huntington spoke for the Trilateral Commission, a small group of well-placed
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The Bellotti decision, then, should be seen as part of a Burkean1.6
counter-revolution against what are considered to be the excesses of
democracy. By glossing over the enormous disparities in wealth (and
thus in political power) between natural persons and corporations,
Justice Powell's opinion served the interests of the dominant economic
form in America - the giant corporations - by helping them to stave off
the "excesses" of "a highly educated, mobilized, and participant society."
Since corporate assets may now be used to further the interests of cor-
porations by allowing them to "speak" even if the issues do not materially
affect their businesses, the corporate enterprise as a political actor will,
simply because of its vastly superior assets, dominate the "democratic"
process of elections and direct voting by referenda or initiatives. We
have come a long, long way since Chief Justice Marshall opined in 1819
that a corporation, as a mere creature of the law, possesses "only those
properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either ex-
pressly, or as incidental to its very existence.' 017 A disembodied
economic entity now can speak.
The incongruity of such a conclusion suggests that the myopia of the
Bellotti majority was willful, not accidental, and that the decision was
reached with full cognizance of its portents. It was deliberately aimed at
enhancing corporate power, and with the obvious secondary conse-
quence of diminishing the power of the individual qua natural person.
This result is achieved, even though the corporation is "a persona ficta,
a 'legal fiction' with no pants to kick or soul to damn. What is meant is
that while we can point to the corporation's steel and glass factory, or its
tangible chairman of the board, or to its offices in Rockefeller Plaza,
there is no physical entity the corporation that we can point to - or that
can, of itself, adulterate foods or pollute rivers. The corporation itself, it
is said 'does no act, speaks no word, thinks no thoughts.' """ It is obvious
that by giving freedom of expression beyond its material needs to the
corporation, the Court was in fact permitting those who control, but do
not necessarily own, the firm to have more than a running start in the
political arena. To paraphrase Chief Justice Taft in a far different deci-
sion: "All others can see and understand this. How can [the Bellotti ma-
jority] properly shut [their] minds to it?"1"9
businessmen, lawyers, and government officials in the United States, Western Europe, and
Japan. See generally TRILATERALISM (H. Sklar ed. 1980).
I" The reference is to Edmund Burke. The late Alexander Bickel was an avowed
Burkean. See A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT (1975). For a discussion of Burke, see F.
O'GORMAN, EDMUND BURKE: HIs POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (1973). Burke, of course, was the
defender of the ancien regime after the French Revolution. See generally E. BURKE,
REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION (1790); E. BURKE, APPEAL FROM THE NEW TO THE OLD WHIGS
(1791), reprinted in EDMUND BURKE: ON GOVERNMENT, POLITICS AND SOCIETY (B. Hill ed.)
(1976).
'n Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819).
108 C. STONE. WHERE THE LAW ENDS 3 (1975) (emphasis added).
10 Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 37 (1922).
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Indeed, how can they? And, indeed, how can such a sagacious com-
mentator as Professor Choper fail to perceive that the Bellotti decision
will have immense long-range effects on the political order-and thus on
the constitutional order? Choper maintains that he is most interested in
judicial review as a means of furthering individual rights-an orienta-
tion precisely 180 degrees away from Powell's opinion. If man is a
machine, and manipulable as such, as Skinner and others maintain,110
then the use of corporate assets to dominate the entire political process
is sure to eventuate. Corporations and other groups in our corporate
society are currently able, through being parts of the "subgovernments"
or "iron triangles" of American government,"' to pursue narrow goals
and to influence greatly, and probably actually control, narrow segments
of the decision-making processes within much of the national govern-
ment. Bellotti gives them a leg up on direct "democracy," including
referenda and initiatives as well as elections to public office.
Of course, corporations as such cannot speak. Identifiable human be-
ings, and only those beings, can. They are the corporate officers, those
who control but, except in family-held firms, do not own. When they
speak, their voices are not merely the voices of disparate individuals,
but the stentorian utterances of the wellnigh bottomless barrels of cor-
porate assets. Those assets give those officers an advantage no other
natural person can hope to have. It is not, as Justice Powell suggested,
merely a matter of giving an even break to the business enterprise (or of
looking at the communication only). The Bellotti Court loaded the
political dice in favor of corporations, by relying on the argument that
the primary function of the first amendment is to inform the public, and
that the people are capable of assessing the relative merits of com-
munications received. True, informing the public is basic to the first
amendment, but the informing function is based on the assumption that
those who speak or would speak are roughly equal in lung power. That
assumption is, as Professor Jerome Barron has shown, wholly inac-
curate."'
The editors of the Harvard Law Review have advanced the odd
argument that there is an even stronger rationale for the decision in
Bellotti: "Corporate political expression should be protected as the
speech and associational activity of the individual owners." ' That
astonishing position completely ignores the facts of business life in large,
..0 Many humanists share Skinner's view that man is a manipulable machine. But see D.
EHRENFELD, THE ARROGANCE OF HUMANISM 236-49 (1978).
111 For a discussion of subgovernments see D. CATER, POWER IN WASHINGTON (1964). For
an analysis of iron triangles, see Heclo, Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment,
in THE NEW AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 87 (A. King ed. 1978). The terms refer to informal
but enduring accommodations linking executive bureaus, Congressional committees, and in-
terest groups with a stake in particular programs. See G. MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY passim (1966).
"' See J. BARRON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR WHOM? 3-7 (1973) (access to modern media
is subject to approval of media managers).
I The Supreme Court 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1, 165 (1978).
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publicly-held firms. For those editors to maintain that "[c]orporate
political expression is simply shareholder speech or the product of
shareholder associational activity" is to confuse the entity with its
shareholders - a relationship which simply does not exist. While a
family-held corporation, such as Cargill or even the Washington Post
Company does reflect its shareholders,"' General Motors or AT&T do
not.
115
If the Supreme Court's basic theory of the first amendment-that
there should be robust debate in a marketplace of ideas-is valid, then
an unfair advantage, which in time will amount to domination of the pro-
cess, will be the result of Bellotti. It is no answer to say, as did Chief
Justice Burger in his concurring opinion, that a "disquieting aspect of
Massachusetts' position is that it may carry the risk of impinging on the
First Amendment rights of those who employ the corporate form ... to
carry on the business of mass communications... .""' To maintain that a
state may regulate the non-business related expression of a corporation
by no means suggests that the state could similarly regulate, say, the
New York Times; for after all, expression is the raison d'etre of the
Times. Chief Justice Burger should decide that wholly fanciful
hypothetical case when it arises, not in a gratuitous dictum uttered in
a dissimilar case. The answer to Burger is the same as Holmes gave to
John Marshall's assertion in McCulloch v. Maryland"' that the power to
tax involves the power to destroy: "Not," Holmes said, "while this Court
sits."
IV. Conclusion
This essay has been directed toward pointing out some of the im-
plications of Justice Powell's majority opinion in First National Bank v.
Bellotti. When coupled with the decisions in Buckley v. Valeo"' and Con-
solidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission,"' the conclusion is
inescapable: a majority of the Justices perceive much of their job to be
that of protecting the class from whence they came-its property, its
status, its position of political power. They have no apparent interest in
"' Cargill is a family-held corporation, see D. MORGAN. THE MERCHANTS OF GRAIN 183
(1979). Even though the Washington Post is now a publicly-held firm, the Graham family
owns more than 50% of the voting stock.
111 See GALBRAITH, supra note 99, at 218.
435 U.S. at 796 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
"1 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
18 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
19 100 S. Ct. 2326 (1980). In Consolidated Edison, Justice Powell held that the first
amendment protected the utility's placement of written material advocating nuclear power
in its billing envelopes. Id. at 2311. On the same day, Powell delivered the opinion in Central
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 100 S. Ct. 2343 (1980), which struck down
a ban on an electric utility's promotion of the use of electricity. Id. at 2354. Central Hudson,
however, deals with "commercial speech" rather than the non-business related speech
involved in Bellotti. Id. at 2351-52. For a discussion of commercial speech, see J. BARRON &
C. DIENES, HANDBOOK OF FREE SPEECH AND FREE PRESS §§ 4.1-4.10 (1979).
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approving any type of wealth distribution scheme, such as was involved
in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.20 That, to be
sure, was an equal protection decision, but the Court's opinion (written
by Justice Powell) permitted the rich, in Professor Laurence Tribe's
words, "to create their own secure haven of privilege and exclusion." '121
Justice Powell also authored the Court's opinion in Bakke," which might
be thought to strike a different note. It does not, for the dispute there
was between "have-nots," not a "have-not" against the "haves"-as in
Rodriguez.
The United States has travelled a long road since the constitutional
convention of 1787 produced the sacred document which is the main ob-
ject of worship in our secular religion of Americanism (or nationalism or
patriotism)." Of major, perhaps greatest, importance in that journey has
been the expansion of the franchise to metes far beyond those of 1789,
when the Constitution went into effect. Then only those with money and
property could vote. Today all but a minute number of wealth limitations
have been eliminated,' women can vote, the voting age has been
lowered to eighteen and even those who cannot speak or read English
can vote."2 That has created a new situation-mass "democ'iacy"-
411 U.S. 1 (1973). In Rodriquez, the Supreme Court upheld a system of local
property taxes imposed to supplement school budgets. Id. at 55. The plaintiffs in Rodriquez
unsuccessfully contended that an educational system that depends on local property taxes is
unconstitutional because it operates to the disadvantage of the poor; some school districts
received more funds than others.
"I L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-56, at 1133 (1978).
2 438 U.S. 265 (1978). See LaRue, The Rhetoric of Powell's Bakke, 38 WASH. & LEE. L.
REV. 43 (1981). Professor LaRue states that Justice Powell's argument "seems to be that cor-
rective justice is permissible, but distributive justice is not," and finds that to be "an
astonishing proposition." Id. at 52. If I understand the terms, "corrective" and
"distributive" justice, correctly, I do not find Powell's position (as defined by Professor
LaRue) at all astonishing. As I have tried to show in this comment, Powell, like other
members of the Court, has no interest in distributive justice as such. Insightful analysis of
the problems of distributive justice may be found in L. THUROW, THE ZERO-SUM SOCIETY
(1980).
" Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B. U. L. REV.
204, 234 (1980); see generally Levinson, "The Constitution" in American CivilReligion, 1979
SUP. CT. REV. 123; Lerner, Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46 YALE L. J. 1290 (1937). It
is worth mentioning that although there is a constitutional separation of church and State in
the United States pursuant to the first amendment, by no means are religion and the
State separated. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) ("We are a religious people
whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being"). For discussion of the two moralities in
American public policy-the pagan and the Judeo-Christian-see Reason of State, supra
note 76, at 588-613. For further discussion of civil or secular religion in the United States,
see M. NOVAK. CHOOSING OUR KING (1974).
"I One wealth limitation on voting that remains is restriction of eligibility to vote for
the board of directors of water districts to landowners. See Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake
Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 730 (1973). Salyer, however, may be an aberration.
The Court is usually hostile to any type of overt voting restriction. See, e.g., Hill v. Stone,
421 U.S. 289, 300-01 (1975) (striking statute which limited right to vote in bond elections to
those who paid property taxes that year).
"I See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 656 (1966).
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which, when coupled with the rise of new pluralistic groups to positions
of power, means that democracy (and pluralism) are considered by some
to be faulty simply because they have been successful.
Politics today is a matter of moving the masses, as congregated in
groups. Groups dominate the political order.2 ' At the same time,
however, a counter-movement has arisen, one designed to retain (or
regain) control by those with money and property through those elected
to public office. We are witnessing, as Galbraith recently said, "the
revolt of the rich against the poor."'" The Supreme Court's opinions in
Bellotti and elsewhere are part of that revolt.
A final note: I realize that some of what is said in this essay cuts
against the grain of much of the popular wisdom or conventional writing
about the Supreme Court. Many commentators, it seems, like to parse
Court opinions to determine whether "neutral principles" were
invoked,"' or they assume that the Justices do not bring their heredity
and biography with them when they join the High Bench. So much
nonsense has been written about "neutral principles" and "reasoned
elaboration" and similar unattainable goals that generations of students
go through law school believing that judges so act, or, if they do not, that
they should. 9 That they do not and, indeed, cannot has long been known,
but also has been the subject of a conspiracy of silence among most who
comment on the judicial process.
Judges are not fungible, as Justice William 0. Douglas once said. 3 '
They bring their "can't-helps" to the bench with them. Try as they might
to achieve a complete disinterestedness, the human mind is not up to
that and myopia is the result. All judges, the late Judge Braxton Craven
maintained, are "result-oriented"-the only difference between them be-
' See R. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES (1967); T. Lowi, THE END
OF LIBERALISM 55-101 (2d ed. 1979); L. THUROW, THE ZERO-SUM SOCIETY (1980).
12 Galbraith, How to Get Ahead, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (July 19, 1979).
2 The seminal essay on the "neutral principles" approach is Wechsler, Toward
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959) [hereinafter cited as
Wechsler], criticized in A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT: MYTH AND REALITY, 51-87 (1978).
'" For a celebration of Wechsler, supra note 128, see Greenawalt, The Enduring
Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 982 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Greenawalt]. Although both Wechsler and Greenawalt, and diverse others, promote the
indispensability of a search for an identification of neutral principles of constitutional ad-
judication, it is odd but true that none of them has ever educated us as to when the
Supreme Court has so acted. Are we not entitled to consider it a bootless quest? The same
may be said for those who believe in "reasoned elaboration." See H. HART & A. SACKS. THE
LEGAL PROCESS §§ 161-70 (10th ed. 1958); White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration:
Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change 59 VA. L. REV. 279 (1973).
13 Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 137 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Everyone knows that judges are not fungible, or at least they should know it, yet it is odd
but true that not one of the coursebooks in constitutional law published for use in law
schools makes reference to that fact of legal life. Those who plump for neutral principles or




ing that some know it and some do not."' This essay opened with a
quotation from Morris R. Cohen about the "imperfect knowledge or in-
telligence" of those in the legal machinery. It is not so much that as the
evaluation placed by judges upon the data brought to them and upon in-
formation that should be known to all. Intelligence the Justices have, of
that there can be no doubt, although some on the present Court surely
rank intellectually higher than others. Again, however, it is how a
Justice uses his intelligence that is important-to what ends, for what
purposes, for whose benefit. For the Bellotti Court to speak of
"democracy" as if it meant something precise, which emphatically it does
not,"' and to equate the political powers of the natural person with that
of corporate enterprise is, as Justice Robert H. Jackson said in another
context, to extend "a promise to the ear to be broken in the hope, a teas-
ing illusion like a munificent bequest in a pauper's will."'"
151 Craven, Paean to Pragmatism, 50 N. CAR. L. REV. 977, 977 (1972). The term "result-
orientation" has become fashionable in recent years as one of opprobrium for judges and
commentators, who are enjoined by some deep-thinkers to eschew who wins-the results-
and look to the reasons. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 129, at 1021; Griswold, Of Time
and Attitudes-Professor Hart and Judge Arnold, 74 HARV. L. REV. 81, 93-94 (1961);
Wechsler, supra note 128, at 18. See also R. FUNSTON, CONSTITUTIONAL COUNTER-
REVOLUTION? 29 (1977): ("Opinions based upon reasoned principle ... are necessary to the
very self-preservation of the Supreme Court. Assuming that the institution is worth preser-
ving, Justices must sometimes sacrifice what they conceive to be a desirable result, if they
cannot logically justify that result.") Professor Funston's statement is consummate
nonsense. Judge Craven, of course, was correct. One does not have to agree with the results
reached to argue that judges (and others) are result-oriented. It is one of the failures of legal
(and other) scholarship for commentators to assume that they, too, are neutral or objective.
See generally Miller, The Myth of Objectivity in Legal Research and Writing, 18 CATH. U.
L. REV. 290 (1969).
' There are at least 200 definitions of the term "democracy." See M. REJAI,
DEMOCRACY: THE CONTEMPORARY THEORIES 23-48 (1967); E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE
SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE 130-31 (1960) ("The great deficiency of American democracy is intel-
lectual, the lack of a good, usuable definition."); see also Crick, Introduction to N.
MACHIAVELLI, THE DISCOURSES 27 (B. Crick ed. 1970) ("to call government 'democratic' is
always a misleading piece of propaganda .... It confuses doctrine with theory; we may want
the democratic element in government to grow greater, but it is still only an element while
it is government at all."); H. ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 117 (1963).
" Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 186 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring). See M. CAR-
NOY & D. SHEARER, ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY 131 (1980) ("The principle of one person/one vote in
the political arena ... confronts the reality of unequal economic rights and an unequal
distribution of economic power. The two cannot be separated. The 'free speech' of a General
Motors is obviously greater than that of any individual."). See also Hart & Shore, Corporate
Spending on State and Local Referendums: First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 28
CASE WEST. RES. L. REV. 808, 829 (1979).
1981]

